Technical Disclosure Commons
Defensive Publications Series
May 2022

Method to support iPSK for WPA3 clients as well as reduce Online
Dictionary Attacks
Niranjan M M
Vijay Kothamasu
Nagaraj Kenchaiah

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series

Recommended Citation
M M, Niranjan; Kothamasu, Vijay; and Kenchaiah, Nagaraj, "Method to support iPSK for WPA3 clients as
well as reduce Online Dictionary Attacks", Technical Disclosure Commons, (May 17, 2022)
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/5139

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Technical Disclosure Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Defensive Publications Series by an authorized administrator of Technical Disclosure Commons.

M M et al.: Method to support iPSK for WPA3 clients as well as reduce Online

Method to support iPSK for WPA3 clients as well as reduce Online Dictionary Attacks

AUTHORS:
Niranjan M M
Vijay Kothamasu
Nagaraj Kenchaiah

ABSTRACT
WPA3 was developed with the backward compatibility into consideration, i.e., if
WPA3 is enabled on WPA2+PSK SSID (also called mixed mode), then both WPA3 and
WPA2-only clients can associate to same SSID. This will work as long as SSID is configured
to use default-PSK. In other words, if SSID is configured with iPSK, then WPA2-only clients
can associate to the SSID using iPSK, but WPA3 clients fails to associate to this SSID using
iPSK, as current WPA3 SAE negotiation does not consider iPSK (unique PSK per client). Also,
WPA3 was introduced to combat offline dictionary attacks on WPA2+PSK by using SAE
protocol where-in an attacker would not be able to go through a word-list and compute a PMK
that comes from the dragonfly handshake to test the MIC of a PTK off-line without interacting
with the Authenticator. But still WPA3 is vulnerable to online dictionary attacks. The
technique presented herein propose method to support iPSK even for the WPA3 clients and
much more beneficial for the mixed-mode (i.e., supporting both WPA2 and WPA3 clients with
iPSK) deployments. Also, this method decreases the attack surface of the WPA3 by
aborting/breaking the SAE negotiation as early as possible.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION
As we know, WPA3 was developed with the backward compatibility into consideration,
i.e., if WPA3 is enabled on WPA2+PSK SSID (also called mixed mode), then both WPA3 and
WPA2-only clients can associate to same SSID. This will work as long as SSID is configured
to use default-PSK. In other words, if SSID is configured with iPSK, then WPA2-only clients
can associate to the SSID using iPSK, but WPA3 clients fails to associate to this SSID using
iPSK, as current WPA3 SAE negotiation does not consider iPSK (unique PSK per client).

Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2022

2

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 5139 [2022]

Also, WPA3 was introduced to combat offline dictionary attacks on WPA2+PSK by using
SAE protocol where-in an attacker would not be able to go through a word-list and compute a
PMK that comes from the dragonfly handshake to test the MIC of a PTK off-line without
interacting with the Authenticator. But still WPA3 is vulnerable to online dictionary attacks.
The technique presented herein propose method to support iPSK even for the WPA3
clients and much more beneficial for the mixed-mode (i.e., supporting both WPA2 and WPA3
clients with iPSK) deployments. Also, this method decreases the attack surface of the WPA3
by aborting/breaking the SAE negotiation as early as possible. With this method, iPSK for
WPA3 clients is supported as well as it reduces the 'online dictionary attacks' on WPA3 SAE
protocol by introducing a communication mechanism (Access-Request/Access-Accept) with
the Authentication Server to fetch iPSK for corresponding client's mac-address as well as using
One Time Cookie (OTC), which is shared in encrypted form between Authenticator and
Supplicant. Further, this OTC would be validated by Authenticator before sending
"Authentication (SAE Confirm)" message back to Supplicant. If validation fails, Authenticator
abort/break the SAE session and sends "SAE Confirm Failure" to the Supplicant.
As per this method, upon receiving "Authentication (SAE Commit") from the Supplicant
(client), Authenticator (WLC) communicate with the Authentication Server (AAA server) to
get iPSK corresponding to the mac-address of the client. Along with iPSK, Authentication
server generates unique "One Time Cookie (OTC)" and send it to Authenticator. Authenticator
uses iPSK to generate parameters (Password Element [PE], kck, mk etc.,) for SAE (Note: "mk"
is used as PMK for 802.11i four-way handshake later). Since this method retrieves iPSK
corresponding to the client mac-address from the Authentication Server, iPSK clients can
associate to the WPA3 enabled SSID as well as to overcome the limitation of mixed mode
(where WPA3 and WPA2 clients can be associated to SSID where-in both WPA3 and
WPA2+PSK are configured. This also helps to reduce attack surface where attacker is trying
with different mac-address and different pass-phrase combinations. Later, Authenticator
encrypts the OTC using Password Element (PE) and sends to Supplicant as part of
"Authentication (SAE Commit)" message. Upon receiving "SAE Commit", Supplicant
generate parameters (kck, mk etc.,) for SAE and further decrypts the OTC using "Password
Element". Further, Supplicant generate and send "Authentication (SAE Confirm)" message
along with OTC encrypted using "mk" to the Authenticator. Upon receiving "SAE Confirm"
message, Authenticator decrypt the OTC using "mk" and validates the OTC. If validation is
successful, then it sends "Authentication (SAE Confirm)" message back to Supplicant. If OTC
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validation fails, it aborts/breaks the SAE session and sends "SAE Confirm Failure" to
Supplicant. Since SAE session aborted upon OTC validation failure, it reduces the attack
surface of WPA3 for Online Dictionary Attack.
Figure-1 describe method to support iPSK for WPA3 clients and also reduce Online Dictionary
Attacks.

Figure-1
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The technique presented herein is explained in detail as below:
•

As part of WPA3 SAE protocol, Supplicant and Authenticator exchange and store
Elliptic Curve Parameters (p, q).

•

Note: Since SAE protocol flow uses multiple independent parameters both on
Supplicant and Authenticator, for simplicity, suffixing the parameters of Supplicant
with "A" and the parameters of Authenticator with "B".

•

On Supplicant (Client):
o

Supplicant generate Password Element (PE) using negotiated algorithm F and
Elliptic Curve Parameters (p, q). It also generates r(A) and m(A).

o

Later r(A) and m(A) are used to generate S(A) and E(A) as mentioned in the
above diagram.

o

Supplicant sends "Authentication (SAE Commit)" message along with S(A) and
E(A) to the Authenticator.

•

On Authenticator (WLC):
o

Upon receiving SAE Commit, Authenticator retrieves the S(A), E(A) and Client
mac-address. Stores S(A) and E(A) for later use.

o

Authenticator sends Access-Request with Client mac-address to the
Authentication Server (AAA server). [In some deployments, local AAA server
would be running on the Authenticator itself].

•

On Authentication Server (AAA server):
o

Upon receiving Access-Request, AAA server retrieve iPSK corresponding to
the mac-address of the Client as well as generate unique One Time Cookie
(OTC) having details of client authentication record as well as expiry time/date.

o

AAA server sends Access-Accept along with retrieved PSK and OTC to the
Authenticator.

o

If iPSK to mac-address is not found, then AAA server sends Access-Reject to
Authenticator.

•

On Authenticator (WLC):
o

Upon receiving Access-Accept, Authenticator retrieves PSK and OTC.

o

Authenticator uses PSK to generate Password Element (PE) using earlier stored
(p, q) using function F().

o

Also, Authenticator generates r(B) and m(B).
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o

r(B) and m(B) are used for generating S(B) and E(B) as mentioned in the above
diagram.

o

Further, S(A) and E(A) received earlier from the Supplicant are used to generate
ss and kck as below:

o

▪

ss = r(B) * (E(A) + (S(A) * PE))

▪

kck + mk = KDF-n(ss).

Authenticator sends "Authentication (SAE Commit)" message along with S(B)
and E(B) to the Supplicant.

o

This message also carries One Time Cookie (OTC) received from the AAA
server, which is encrypted using Password Element (PE).

•

On Supplicant (Client):
o

Upon receiving SAE Commit, Supplicant retrieves the S(B), E(B) and
encrypted OTC.

o

o

Further, Supplicant uses S(B) and E(B) to generate ss and kck as below:
▪

ss = r(A) * (E(B) + (S(B) * PE))

▪

kck + mk = KDF-n(ss).

Also Supplicant decrypts OTC using Password Element (PE) and store OTC for
later use.

o

Further, Supplicant generate and send "Authentication (SAE Confirm)"
message with confirm(A) = H(kck + S(A) + S(B) + E(A) + E(B)) to the
Authenticator.

o
•

This message also carries OTC encrypted using "mk".

On Authenticator:
o

Upon receiving "SAE Confirm", Authenticator retrieves encrypted OTC from
the message. Decrypt the OTC using "mk" generated earlier.

o

Authenticator validates the OTC. If validation is success, it will send
"Authentication (SAE Confirm)" message with confirm(B) = H (kck + S(B) +
S(A) + E(B) + E(A)) to the Supplicant. If validation fails, abort the session and
send "SAE Failure" back to the Supplicant.

o

Since SAE session aborted upon OTC validation failure, it reduces the attack
surface of WPA3 for Online Dictionary Attack.

•

On Supplicant:
o

Upon receiving SAE Confirm, Supplicant would go for association phase and
followed by EAPOL four-way handshake process as per the existing art.
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In summary, the techniques presented herein propose method wherein, the One Time
Cookie (OTC) shared between Authentication Server, Authenticator and Supplicant reduces
the Online Dictionary Attack on WPA3. OTC is always sent in encrypted form between
Authenticator and Supplicant, hence through OTC validation, validating the SAE messages
exchanged. If validation failed, aborting/breaking the current SAE session. Moreover, no
additional configuration needed for this mechanism and keep it simple, but still WPA3 clients
can use iPSK while associating to WPA3 SSID and hence much more secure. Also, existing
messages are leveraged to carry attestation information between Authenticator and Supplicant,
which will keep the implementation simple. Additionally, with mixed-mode (i.e., SSID
configured to support both WPA3 and WPA2+PSK), both types of clients can use iPSK
(unique PSK per client) for connectivity.
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